2009”N3ŒŽ
3/26i–Øj 16F15`18F30

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Rohit Rahi
(London School of Economics)

John Quah
(University of Oxford)

Arbitrage network (with Jean-Pierre Zigrand)


Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order (with Bruno Strulovici)
3/12i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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Piero Gottardi

iEuropean University Institutej

Equilibrium Corporate Finance
2009”N2ŒŽ
2/26i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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Meg Sato

iMarshall School of Business, University of Southern Californiaj

Bargaining Within the Organization: Why There is too Much Inertia
2/19i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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‹ÚàV@¬O

i‘åã‘åŠwj

Auction for Public Construction with Corner-Cutting
(with Akai, K.. and Saijo, T.)
2/12i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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¬—Ñ@‘n

i‘åã•{—§‘åŠwj

Experiments on Emergence of Leadership in Teams
2/5i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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‰ï‹cŽº

Klaus@Kultti

iUniversity of Helsinkij

Sellers like clusters
2009”N1ŒŽ
1/29i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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Jingang Zhao

(RIEB, Kobe University and U. Saskatchewan)

The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games
1/22i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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Matthew Ryan

(University of Auckland)

Truth-In-Advertising Laws and Pharmaceutical Promotion
1/15i–Øj 16F15`18F30

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16F15`17F15
Marco Mariotti
iQueen Mary,
University of Londonj

17F30`18F30
Paola Manzini
iQueen Mary,
University of Londonj

A million answers to twenty questions: choosing by checklist



Categorize Then Choose: Boundedly Rational Choice and Welfare
1/8i–Øj 17F30`18F30

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ìú±@—Y“ñ˜Y

i‹ž“s‘åŠw‘åŠw‰@j

One-to-Many Non-Cooperative Matching Games
2008”N12ŒŽ
12/25i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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Yeneng Sun

(National University of Singapore)

Modeling Large Societies with Uncertainty
12/18i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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“nç²@’¼Ž÷

i’}”g‘åŠwj

Bargaining Outcomes in Patent Licensing:
Asymptotic Results in a General Cournot Market,
with Shin Kishimoto and Shigeo Muto
12/10ij 17F00`18F30

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˜Zb‘äƒLƒƒƒ“ƒpƒX


Œo‰cŠwŒ¤‹†‰È’†‰ï‹cŽºi˜Zb‘ä‘æŽOŠwŽÉˆêŠKj

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iYale Universityj

Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms

m”õlF˜Zb‘äƒZƒIƒŠ[ƒZƒ~ƒi[i_ŒË‘åŠwj‚Ƃ̇“¯ƒZƒ~ƒi[n
12/4i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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‰ï‹cŽº

“n•Ó@—²—T

iŽñ“s‘åŠw“Œ‹žj

Monotone Dynamics for the Maximal Equilibrium
of Markov games with Strategic Complementarities
(with Hideaki Yamashita)
2008”N11ŒŽ
11/27i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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ŒÃ‘ò@‘׎¡

iˆê‹´‘åŠwj

Firm Heterogeneity, Financial Imperfection, and International Trade (with Noriyuki Yanagawa)
11/6i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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¼“‡@Ä

i“Œ‹ž‘åŠwj

Implementation and Social Influence

m”õlF˜Zb‘äƒZƒIƒŠ[ƒZƒ~ƒi[i_ŒË‘åŠwj‚Ƃ̇“¯ƒZƒ~ƒi[n
2008”N10ŒŽ
10/30i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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iˆê‹´‘åŠwj

The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment
10/23i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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Ori Haimanko

iBen-Gurion University
of the Negevj

On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium
10/16i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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Frank Hansen

iUniversity of Copenhagenj

Decreasing relative risk premium and risk vulnerability
10/9i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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…–ì@—Ï—
i_ŒË‘åŠw‘åŠw‰@j

Network Formation with Altruism toward Direct Connections

Direct Marketing in Duopolistic Wholesale Market
10/2i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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iŠwK‰@‘åŠwj

Choosing a Volunteer through a War of Attrition
2008”N9ŒŽ
9/4i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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‰ï‹cŽº

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ˆîŒ©@—T‰î
i‹ž“s‘åŠw‘åŠw‰@j

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i•ñŽÒ‚Í’¼‘O‚ɒljÁ‚³‚ê‚é‰Â”\«‚ª‚ ‚è‚Ü‚·j


The Buy Price in Auctions with Discrete Type Distributions

Leadership by Confidence in Teams

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2008”N8ŒŽ
8/28i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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ŒoÏŒ¤‹†Š

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Marco Ottaviani

iNorthwestern Universityj

Aggregation of Information and Beliefs in Prediction Markets

Noise, Information, and the Favorite-Longshot Bias in Parimutuel Predictions
2008”N7ŒŽ
7/24i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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Kwan@Koo@Yun

iƒjƒ…[ƒˆ[ƒNB—§‘åŠw
AlbanyZ,@“ú–{‘åŠwj

On Pareto Gains from Trade through Income Taxation
7/17i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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Œ´@çH

i‹ž“s‘åŠwj

Pareto improvement and agenda control of sequential financial innovations
7/10i–Øj 16F20`17F50

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‰ï‹cŽº

—Ñ@‹MŽu

iƒeƒLƒTƒX‘åŠwAustinZ,
‹ž“s‘åŠw‹qˆõj

Choice and Individual Welfare
7/3i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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‹gŒ´@’¼‹B

iˆê‹´‘åŠwj

The injustice of exploitation
2008”N6ŒŽ
6/26i–Øj 16F30`18F00

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Šˆä@ŒúŽu
i‹ž“s‘åŠwj

Hiroshi Uno
i‘åã‘åŠwj

mŠeŽíŠw‰ï•ñ—ûK‰ïn

Sunspot Equilibria in a Production Economy: do animal spirits cause overproduction?

Nested Potentials and Robust Equilibria

6/19i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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i‘åãŒoÏ‘åŠwj

On the Bilateral Contracting Process in Economies with Externalities
6/12i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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‰ï‹cŽº

ƒOƒŒ[ƒ”ƒ@ Žq

iŒcœä‹`m‘åŠwj

Cooperation in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Outside Options
6/5i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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‘· ”J

iãŠCàŒo‘åŠw@ŒoÏŠw‰@,
‹ž“s‘åŠw‹qˆõj

An efficient dynamic auction for multiple complements
2008”N5ŒŽ
5/29i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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iŠÖ¼‘åŠwj

Cheap Talk with the Exit Option: A Model of Exit and Voice
5/22i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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‘æ‚R‹¤“¯
Œ¤‹†Žº

Jeong-Yoo Kim

iKyung Hee University,
‘åã‘åŠwŽÐ‰ïŒoÏŒ¤‹†Š‹qˆõj

The Economics of Citation
5/15i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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‰ï‹cŽº

’†¼@ŒPŽk

i_ŒË‘åŠwj

Constructive proof of existence and characterization of the farsighted stable set in a price-leadership cartel model under the optimal pricing policy (co-authored with Yoshio Kamijo)
5/8i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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Έä@—Ç•ã
i‹ž“s‘åŠw‘åŠw‰@j

ˆîŒ©@—T‰î
i‹ž“s‘åŠw‘åŠw‰@j

Optimal Execution in a Market with Small Investors


The Buy Price in Auctions with Discrete Type Distributions
2008”N4ŒŽ
4/24i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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ŒoÏŒ¤‹†Š

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쑺@“N–ç
i‹ž“s‘åŠw‘åŠw‰@j

“c@‰€
i‹ž“s‘åŠw‘åŠw‰@j


A Successful Strategy for Mutual Cooperation in the Experimental Multi-game Contact

Reorganization Strategies and Securities Valuation under Asymmetric Information

4/17i–Øj 17F00`18F30

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‰ï‹cŽº

ˆäã@•ü‹I

iŠwUPD/
Bielefeld University [4/1‚æ‚è]j

A note on the strict core of a Shapley-Scarf economy