|
2/20iΰj |
17F00`18F30 |
sεw
oΟ€
οcΊ
|
Harrison Cheng
isεwEμJtHjAεwj
|
Analyzing Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: A New Approach
|
2/19(Ψj
|
17F00`18F30 |
sεw
oΟ€οcΊ |
|
WTO as Moral Support
|
2003N12 |
12/19iΰj |
14F30`16F00 |
sεw
oΟ€
ζR€―€Ί |
Oξ@[W
ikεwj
|
Convergence Theorems of Willingness-to-pay and Willingness-to accept
|
12/11(Ψj
|
17F00`18F30 |
sεw
oΟ€
οcΊ |
John H. Nachbar
( Washingtonεw)
|
General Equilibrium Comparative Statics: Discrete Shocks in Production Economies
|
2003N10 |
10/31(ΰj |
15F00`16F30 |
sεw
oΟ€
ζR€―€Ί |
_ζ@ΉG
iεwj
|
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (joint with OBARA, Ichiro(UCLA)
|
10/30(Ψj |
16F30`18F00 |
εγεw
Ϋφ€τ
€Θ
6F |
ΒΨ@ζq
iκ΄εwj
|
Economics of Number Portability-Switching costs and Two-part Tarriff (with John Small)
|
10/27ij
|
17F00`18F30 |
sεw
oΟ€
οcΊ |
Quan@Wen
(Vanderbiltεw)
|
A Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining Model
|