2004”N2ŒŽ
2/20i‹ΰj 17F00`18F30

‹ž“s‘εŠw
ŒoΟŒ€‹†Š

‰ο‹cŽΊ

Harrison Cheng

i‹ž“s‘εŠwE“μƒJƒŠƒtƒHƒ‹ƒjƒA‘εŠwj

Analyzing Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: A New Approach

2/19(–؁j

17F00`18F30 ‹ž“s‘εŠw
ŒoΟŒ€‹†Š‰ο‹cŽΊ

ŒΓ‘ς@‘ΧŽ‘

iˆκ‹΄‘εŠwj

WTO as Moral Support
2003”N12ŒŽ
12/19i‹ΰj 14F30`16F00 ‹ž“s‘εŠw
ŒoΟŒ€‹†Š

‘ζ‚R‹€“―Œ€‹†ŽΊ

ŽO‘ξ@[“W

i“Œ–k‘εŠwj

Convergence Theorems of Willingness-to-pay and Willingness-to accept

12/11(–؁j

17F00`18F30 ‹ž“s‘εŠw
ŒoΟŒ€‹†Š

‰ο‹cŽΊ
John H. Nachbar

( Washington‘εŠw)
General Equilibrium Comparative Statics: Discrete Shocks in Production Economies
2003”N10ŒŽ
10/31(‹ΰj 15F00`16F30 ‹ž“s‘εŠw
ŒoΟŒ€‹†Š

‘ζ‚R‹€“―Œ€‹†ŽΊ

_Žζ@“ΉG

i“Œ‹ž‘εŠwj

Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (joint with OBARA, Ichiro(UCLA)
10/30(–؁j 16F30`18F00 ‘εγ‘εŠw
‘ΫŒφ‹€­τ
Œ€‹†‰Θ
6F

Β–؁@—ζŽq

iˆκ‹΄‘εŠwj

Economics of Number Portability-Switching costs and Two-part Tarriff (with John Small)
10/27iŒŽj
17F00`18F30 ‹ž“s‘εŠw
ŒoΟŒ€‹†Š

‰ο‹cŽΊ

Quan@Wen

(Vanderbilt‘εŠw)

A Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining Model